# Cheatography

#### Mobile Cheat Sheet

by rschacht via cheatography.com/23536/cs/11637/

| Security Ba                            | sics   | Security Ba  | sics (cont)   | power/ene   | rgy  | Recent T  | rends in Security  |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|---|--|
| Symmetric<br>Key                       | One key is shared<br>by two users both<br>encryption &                                   | Most<br>problemati<br>c part in                      | Android<br>abstraction layer  | factors<br>that affect<br>power   | power affects temp, but energy doesn't   | ID vs<br>Auth   | Auth = username +<br>pass, ID = passwd &<br>something like   |
|  | decryption<br>(substiution cipher,   | mobil<br>apps?                                       |   | equations   | power/area proportional to<br>temp   | Data  | biometric sending false radio  |
| Assymetric                             | aes, des)<br>Public and Private<br>Key   | Preventing<br>replay<br>attacks?                     | Use a nonce   | associatio<br>ns  | higher current implies high<br>power which increases cpu<br>frequency                        | injection   | signal to pace maker<br>and inducing heart<br>attack   |
| Substitution<br>Ciper<br>Diffie-       | cipher 2^n/2 Sy  | Pros of<br>Symmetric<br>Keys                         | No worry of replay<br>or man in the<br>middle attacks   | thermal<br>runaway  | power -> temp -> resistance<br>decrease -> current increase I<br>(cycle)                     | Threat<br>Model/At<br>tack<br>model                           | What the system<br>thinks about the<br>model. Believes<br>attacker is much<br>more powerful than<br>he actually is. Attack |
| Exchange medium. Known large prime and |  | Agreement<br>on shared<br>key<br>Certificate<br>Auth | diffie helman or<br>KDC<br>Binds pub key to<br>part. entity. E<br>registers with CA.<br>When Alice wants<br>bobs pub key, get<br>the certificate,<br>apply CA pub key<br>and get bobs pub<br>key. | energy  | asffects battery life, power *<br>time = E   |   |  |
|  | base shared and a  |  |   | energy solar, wind -> high capacity,<br>harvesting low leakage (low discharge),<br>low capacity, high leakage<br>(quick discharge), appliance   |  | model attacker<br>believes it knows a<br>lot about the system |  |
| DES                                    | 56-bit symmetric<br>key, 64bit plain<br>text US standard                                 |  |   |   | (quick discharge), appliance   | Key<br>establish  | Done using human<br>body   |
| AES                                    | Replaces DES<br>128 bit  |  |   | Certificate Authority Certification authorities Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. E registers its public key with CA. E provides 'proof of identity' to CA. |  | ment in<br>physi.<br>sec.                                     |  |
| Axor0,<br>AxorA                        | A, 0   |  |   |   |  | Ways to   | brute force feature  |
| Main Sec.<br>Probs In<br>Mobile?       | Config.<br>management,<br>excessive<br>privleges, privacy<br>violations, poor<br>session | Symmetric<br>and Public<br>Key<br>Problems           | Sym: establish<br>shared key?<br>(deffie-helman,<br>KDC), Public<br>Key(Man in<br>middle) use CA  | <ul> <li>CA creates certified</li> </ul>  | ficate binding E to its public key.<br>ining E's public key digitally signed by CA – CA says | fool<br>machine   | guess, generate<br>signal (generative),<br>evasion, poison   |

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| Recent Trends in Security   |   | Recent Trends in Security (cont)                 |  | Internet of 7                             | Internet of Things   |   | Internet of Things (cont)  |  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| (cont)<br>Evasion<br>attack | create points to<br>gain access<br>without getting                                  | Foreign<br>Agent<br>security<br>perform          | Consumes less ip addresses than<br>mobile host<br>Increase in security strength -><br>hardening Hardening implies more | Challenges<br>of CPS                      | hard to know how<br>many sensors to<br>use, what data to<br>collect                          | Difference<br>between<br>gps and<br>tower | gps needs clear<br>line of sight and is<br>more accurate.<br>Tower based                       |  |
| Poison                      | caught, alter<br>features<br>attacker can see                                       | ance<br>tradeoff                                 | difficult classification boundaries<br>May increase False positives or<br>negatives How to find a balance              | Cyber<br>Physical<br>Systems              | embedding<br>sensors into<br>physical devices  | based<br>location<br>managem              | management is bad<br>if you're not near<br>tower, accessibility                                |  |
| attack                      | the training set,<br>injects their own<br>data at key<br>points, skews the<br>lines | Hardenii   | between security strength and<br>performance? Multi-objective<br>optimization problem<br>ng Technique                  | Human to<br>Human<br>interaction          | person a thinks<br>about a color red<br>and that dot is<br>displayed to<br>another person in | ent?<br>what is iot                       | is less than gps.<br>Network of Physical<br>Objects embedded<br>systems with<br>electronics,   |  |
| Biometric signals           | Signals that don't<br>change like<br>fingerprints                                   |  | ARDENING TECHNIQUE   | 3<br>charactertis                         | another country<br>anytime, anything,<br>any place   |   | software, sensors<br>enable objects to<br>exchange data with                                   |  |
| Physiologi<br>cal signals   | hard because constantly   | <ul> <li>Measures</li> <li>Fitness ch</li> </ul> | to improve security of ML algorithms<br>eck  | tics of IOT<br>devices                    | connetion  |   | manufacturer,<br>operator, other<br>devices through  |  |
| Hardening<br>Technique      | changing<br>instead of line,<br>have piecewise<br>curves, or instead<br>of line use |  | complexity of classifiers  | USN<br>application<br>layer               | where apps are<br>built to perform<br>tasks using the<br>sensors through<br>middleware       |   | network<br>infrastructure allow<br>remote control<br>direct integration<br>computer + physical |  |
| Internet<br>Control         | polygon(polytope)<br>agent<br>advertisement,  |  |  | middleware (Drivers)                      | allows you to build<br>apps on top of iot<br>sensors   |   | world Result:<br>automation in all<br>fields   |  |
| Protocol<br>Messages        | agent<br>solicitation,<br>registration<br>request,<br>registration reply            |  |  | sensor<br>networking<br>layer<br>(bottom) | sensors are<br>launched in<br>environment and<br>report to usn                               |   |  |  |

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| Challenges in Security   | RSA Example   | CUDA (cont)  |   |
|--|---|--|---|
| Challenges resource constraints in<br>in medical sensors, poor software dev<br>apps support, real-time<br>requirements for health apps   | RSA example:<br>Bio Assert 6 of 11 rear R, pM<br>solution 6 of 12 rear R, pM<br>solution 6 of 12 rear R and R and R and<br>sorrystic for a second solution for<br>damystic for a second solution for<br>the second solution for the second solution for the second solution<br>for the second solution for the second solut | global   | As before,global is a<br>CUDA C keyword meaning<br>— add() will execute on the<br>device — add() will be called<br>from the host  |
| Network Sec<br>What is network security?<br>Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should<br>"understand" message contents<br>• sender encrypts message<br>Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of<br>each other<br>Message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure<br>message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without<br>detection<br>Access and availability: services must be accessible and<br>available to users<br>Challenges cps<br>CPS – Properties, Issues, Challenges   | <b>RSA Continued RSA:</b> Why is that $m = (m^e \mod n)^d \mod n$ Useful number theory result: If $p,q$ prime and $n = pq$ , then: $x' \mod n = x' \mod (p-1)(q-1) \mod n$ $(m^e \mod n)^d \mod n = m^{ed} \mod n$ $= m^{ed} \mod (p-1)(q-1) \mod n$ $(using number theory result above)$ $= m^1 \mod n$ $(since we chose ed to be divisible by (p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1)$ $= m$ <b>Diffie-Helman Deffie-Helman Key Exchange</b> secret integer  | memory<br>management   | Host and device memory<br>are distinct entities —<br>Device pointers point to<br>GPU memory May be<br>passed to and from host<br>code May not be<br>dereferenced from host<br>code — Host pointers point<br>to CPU memory May be<br>passed to and from device<br>code May not be<br>dereferenced from device<br>code May not be |
| <ul> <li>Arrow takes the strates of the strates</li></ul> | a<br>g <sup>a</sup> mod p<br>g <sup>b</sup> mod p<br>(g <sup>b</sup> mod p) <sup>a</sup> mod p<br>(g <sup>a</sup> mod p) <sup>b</sup> mod p<br>Key: (g <sup>b</sup> mod p) <sup>a</sup> mod p= (g <sup>a</sup> mod p) <sup>b</sup> mod p<br>System Model  | Subject Response<br>Biometric Sensor<br>1. Evidence<br>Tampering (1) | ion Feature<br>Extraction Classification Classification<br>Previous Data<br>9. Overriding<br>Final Decision Making Response   |
| Indexing Arrays With Threads And Blocks • No longer as simple as just using thread.dx.x or block.dx.x as indices • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array with 1 thread per entry (using 8 threads/block) • To index array using threads/block, a unique array index for each entry given by int index = threadfldx.x + blocktdx.x * b   | SYSTEM MODEL  |  |   |
|  | CUDA<br>CUDA Terminology Host – The CPU and<br>basics its memory (host memory) Device<br>– The GPU and its memory (device<br>memory   |  |   |

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