Show Menu
Cheatography

Company Law | Veil Lifting Cheat Sheet (DRAFT) by

corporate personality & veil lifting answer structure

This is a draft cheat sheet. It is a work in progress and is not finished yet.

summary of facts

- briefly state case facts
- mention issues at hand
- topics to which question relates

general law

Pursuant to the general principle elucidated in Saloman v. Saloman, Xmay encounter issues in holding Y liable as regards the concept of limited liability. Such flows from that of Separate Legal Person­ality (SLP) establ­ished in the seminal case of Saloman which elucid­ates, in essence, that an incorp­orated company is a recognized legal person with its own SLP - entirely divorced from its shareh­olders & employees. In contin­uation of the principle, the undert­akings of a subsidiary also cannot generally be associated as actions taken by the parent (ABC company). Given that in the aforem­ent­ioned situation, the XXX activities were undertaken by Z rather than Y (the entity in contract with X), the terms of the sale contract appear to remain adhered to. Hence, X cannot undertake legal actions against Y or its subsidiary Z as they are both to be regarded as separate legal persons in the eyes of the law.
In consid­eration of such, X may only be able to attain redress by bringing an action against Z for the liability of Y via lifting the corporate veil which exist between the two and imposing liability upon its shareh­olders (members). However, to lift said veil; which distin­guishes between a company as a SPL and its members; OG must first succeed in persuading the court to ‘lift the corporate veil’. It may be pertinent to note here that as Z is not currently under any threat of insolvent liquid­ation, statutory veil lifting is inappl­icable. As such the foregoing discussion shall deliberate upon judicial means of veil lifting.
 

veil lifting

'Lifting' the veil may encompass a wider range of circum­stances where liability is imposed on members or directors or the veil is looked through, including occasions where the Salomon principle remains intact.
in an attempt to circumvent situations of fraud, it at time proves necessary to lift the veil of incorp­oration - which would impose a liability upon the officers and owners of the company
veil lifting may be observed via statutory or judicial approaches

statutory veil lifting

ONLY APPLIES WHEN COMPANY IS IN INSOLVENT LIQUID­ATION
UNCOMMON & usually impose additional liability rather than ignoring separate person­ality
FRAUDULENT TRADING
defined u/s. 213, Insolvency Act, 1986 - civil liability for fraudulent trading
at the time of closing/ winding up of company
appears that business carried out with intent to: (a) defraud creditors of company, (b) creditors in general or (c) for any other fraudulent purpose
any person' knowingly party to this act is liable - includes ALL officers & members
Re Todd - D committed fraud to company, had to contribute to debts upon liquid­ation
Re Patrick & Lyon - fraud involoves proving actual dishon­esty, involving real moral blame upon commercial men
very high threshold
b/c if fraud proven u/s. 213, very likely s.992 of Companies Act, 2006 will also be imposed --- which incurs CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Morphitis v Bernasconi - issue whether failing to pay instalment to landlord enough to discharge s.213
Not every fraudulent transa­ction makes business one carried on with intent to defraud
must be a causal connec­tion/ nexus between the fraud and the loss
WRONGF­UL/­NEG­LIGENT TRADING
implem­ented to remedy diffic­ulties of imposing s.213
courts can lift veil if:
1 D knew/ ought to have concluded WHILE CONDUCTING BUINESS BEFORE LIQUID­ATION
2 about real prospect of company not avoiding insolvent liquid­ation (insol­vency)
3 only applies upon Ds -- INCLUDES SHADOW Ds
Re Produce Marketing - Ds continued to run business after knowing it had reached the point of no-return - liable to pay company's debts after insolvent liquid­ation
Re Road Gunner Organi­zation - no proof of wrongdoing but negligence element present
 

judicial veil lifting

IF STATUTORY VEIL LIFTING IS INAPPL­ICABLE, RELIANCE UPON COMMON LAW RULES
In the given scenario, firstly, I shall assess the 'single economic unit' and 'mere façade' grounds, and then consider the use of agency, tort, or other means to avoid (rather than pierce) veil.
MERE FACADE
initially, common law rules were very uncertain
will only occur due to (1) POLICY REASONS (2) COMPANY WAS OPERATING AS A MERE FACADE (FRAUD)
- multiple cases arose before courts but Adams v. Cape Industries recognised no clear defination was provided
defination since clarified in Prest v. Petrodale
Prest v. Petrodale - exisitng legal obligation delibr­ately evaded NOT CONCEALED (Rossendale v Hurstwood (2021))
Woolfson v. Strath­clyde - requir­ement of company being used as a mere façade concealing true facts (VTB v Nurtitek)
- seems improp­riety in company operations required
using SLP to push liability onto another member of a group not improp­riety (Prest)
Trustor v. Smallbone - must be a connection between improp­riety & use of corporate form (Prest - statute not to be used as vehicle for fruad)
- motivation behind INITIAL incorp­oration importance - if corporate form used to evade existing liability, veil lifted
HOWEVER, initial formation not important anymore (Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif) (VTB v. Nutritek)
Jones v. Lipman - land sold by individual who later transf­erred title to his incorp­orated company to avoid sale. veil lifted
acc. to Salomon, company is SLP and cannot be sued but veil was lifted, held it was being used as a vehicle for fraud/ used as a mere facade
Trustor v. Smallbone - use of company to hide misapp­rop­riated money
Re Bugle Press - abuse of legisl­ation
SINGLE ECONOMIC UNIT
- where 1 company owns all issued share capital in other companies - such is known as 'wholly owned subsid­aries; defined u/s. 1159 CA, 2006
strict applic­ation of Salomon to this principle would make parent company, in theory, untouc­hable by law for abused by subsidiary due to limited liability
- L. Denning in DHN v. IRC - Consider the group structure as a 'single economic unit'
disapp­roved by HoL in Woolfson v Strath­clyde
Re a Company - veil will be 'pierced' if necessary to achieve justice ( also disapp­roved by HoL)
Lowry disapp­roved interv­ent­ionist approach, saying it will lead to uncert­ainty about safety of incorp­oration - use of policy to remove legal principles not welcomed
Gallagher - neg. impact of veil lifting on other legal aspects (Director Duties, individual tax princi­ples, Foss v Hartbottle rule)
CURRENT AUTHORITY - ADAMS v.CAPE INDUSTRIES*
Facts: Cape (UK based company) held multiple subsid­iaries, some of which operated in US. Cape denied enforc­ement of ruling by US courts against its subsid­iaries (juris­dic­tion).
UK courts held US judgement to only be enforc­eable if Cape was present in US or had taken part in US procee­dings (neither was true)
Adams sought to lift veil to show that Cape was present in US through its subsid­aries
COURTS HELD ----- on what grounds should NOT veil be lifted
Denied Re A Company - lifting to avoid injustice
Denied DHN - 'single economic unit'
ACCEPTED GROUNDS
4. mere façade concealing true facts - to avoid pre-ex­isting obligation (Jones v. Lipman)
5. single economic entity - where upon proper reading of a CONTRACT or STATUE, appears that multiple companies in a group are being treated as one (Beckett Investment v Hall)
however, given the limited scope of this ground, the veil remains largely 'opaque and impass­able' (Adams)
Raja v Van Hoogst­raten - recent shift of courts from narrow approach
6. agency principle - an arrang­ement in which one entity legally appoints another to act on its behalf ( princi­ple­-agent relation)
express - through agreement or contract
implied - observance of daily transa­ctions
Smith, Stone & Knight - criteria for agency establ­ished (profits, director, shareh­olders , constant control)
Millam v Print Factory - passes where attrib­ution of high level of control by parent
subsidiary must be incapable of indepe­ndent action (Re FG (Films))
agency can't be presumed from closeness of operations between parent & subsidiary (Yukong Line v Rendsburg)
EXCEPTIONS TO ADAMS
Creasey v. Breachwood Motors - veil disreg­arded where common direct­orship + membership AND assets transf­erred b/w 2 w/o Ds consid­ering their duties as such
{fa-as­ter­isk}} overruled in Ord v. Bellhaven Pubs - reorga­niz­ation of sister companies for legitimate reason is not mere façade (motive of Ds to be consid­ered)
Prest v. Petrodel - where company under existing legal obliga­tions delibe­rately evades it (Evasion) enforc­ement of obligation is delibe­rately frustrated by interp­osing a company under another company's control (Conce­alment) ---- VERY LIMITED APPLIC­ATION
Raja v Van Hoogst­raten - shift from narrow approach, veil lifted even if formation of company was genuine
TORT
tortious liability against member (or director) for activities carried out through medium of the company has possib­ility of negating Salomon
Godwin v Shell - however, courts generally hesitant to impose such on potential of damaging SLP principle (Thompson v Renwick - criteria for establ­ishing tortious liability, following ruling of Caparo v. Dickman)
parent & subsidiary in the same principle line of business --- NO DUTY IF PARENT NOT DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN SAME ACTIVITY [purely holding company] (Thompson)
parent controlled subsidiary in matters related to commission of tort (proxi­mity)
parent knew/ought to have known subsid­iary's actions risked injury
if proven, is it fair, just & reasonable to impose duty
negligence
Chandler v. Cape - specific interv­ention by parent/// parallel DoC b/w parent & subsidiary employees and subsidiary & its employees ------­---­--a­ssu­mption of respon­sib­ility by the parent over health and safety policy at subsidiary created special relati­onship b/w employee and parent, giving rise to DoC. Damages payable
Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell (2021) - courts seemed to move away from Chandler, now holding parent liable for tort of misfea­sance (SUFFI­CIENT interv­ention by parent in subsid­iary's operat­ions)
reinforces position set out in Vedanta v. Lungowe regarding the flexib­ility of the English courts' jurisd­iction over parent company liability claims
Lubbe v. Cape - tortious liability applicable on non-em­ployee victims too (Lungowe v. Vedanta)
AAA v. Unilever - complete parent's control over subsidiary not required (like that in agency req.). Even advice given will suffice
economic loss due to negligent missta­ement
D or employee of company PERSONALLY be liable only if assumption of respon­sib­ility to create special relati­onship exists (*William v. NLHF
if tort of deceit involved, liability will flow to D or employee (SCB v. Pakistan NSC) (Barclay v. Waypharm)